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Municipal Ownership of Cable
Television: Some Issues and
Problems
By MICHAEL J. HENDERSON*
It cannot be denied that cable television has matured into an
accepted and important member of the media. For a variety of rea-
sons, including increased programming due to modern satellite dis-
semination capabilities, cable television has penetrated urban mar-
kets in recent years and entered a new competitive era.'
This phenomenon has been accompanied by increased interest in
municipal ownership of cable television.' This interest raises a
number of unanswered questions about the legal limitations on
municipal involvement with the cable television medium. For ex-
ample, would a city have to accept competition from other cable-
casters under the antitrust laws? Would a city violate the First
Amendment if it established itself as the only cable television dis-
seminator? Without attempting to provide any answers, the follow-
ing discussion will identify some of the issues and problems which
will confront any municipality contemplating a municipal cable
television system.
* Associate, Farrow, Schildhause & Wilson, Oakland, California; A.B., 1977, Harvard Uni-
versity; J.D., 1980, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Some indication of the changes in the cable television media are discussed in the recent
United States Supreme Court decision, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
- U.S. , 102 S.Ct. 835, 839 & n.3 (1982). In support of its observations on the develop-
ment of cable television, the Supreme Court quoted from the district court opinion in the
same case, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1036-37
(D. Colo. 1979). The district court's decision was reversed by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.
1980), but the Supreme Court's decision reversed the Tenth Circuit's reversal.
2. For instance, the City of Cambridge, Massachusetts is considering a municipally-owned
system. Construction Study Released for City-Owned System in Cambridge, Multichannel
News, February 1, 1982, at 7. A recently introduced U.S. Senate Bill would, inter alia, pro-
hibit a municipality from owning or operating a cable television system which it did not
acquire at fair market value. S. 2172, § 605(c), 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982).
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I.
Municipalities' Power to Restrict Rights-of-Way
A. Conventional Access To Streets
Generally, a municipality may require permission to use its
streets for "uses other than ordinary pedestrian travel . . . ."' Mu-
nicipalities may also, by exercising their police power, generally
regulate businesses that provide entertainment and recreation,
such as theaters or restaurants. In the same vein, municipalities
might argue that they may restrict cable companies' use of public
rights-of-way located within their boundaries.
However, the need to obtain permission, and the obvious fact
that cities can regulate street use, may not support the conclusion
that exclusive or overly intrusive arrangements are proper. For ex-
ample, virtually all states agree that cable television is not a public
utility.' It cannot be seriously argued that, like water or electricity,
cable television services are a necessity of life." Moreover, a cable
operator possessing First Amendment protection could never logi-
cally be considered a public utility. Accordingly, a public utility
-type franchise may not be appropriate in the cable television con-
text, and exclusive arrangements are commonly invalidated."
The power of municipalities to deny cable television companies
access to public rights-of-way may be minimal. The reason for re-
quiring permission to use streets is generally said to be the promo-
tion of public safety.' But in most states, the safety of both aerial
and underground constructions is supervised by a state agency.9
Regulation of ordinary businesses is also designed to protect the
public.10 But this regulatory authority "is limited by public policy
to promote the growth of commerce and industry . . . . [A] munic-
ipality may not, under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrar-
ily interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations,
3. 9 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 26-155, at 389 (3rd ed. 1978).
4. 7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 24.198, at 14 (3rd ed. 1981).
5. See, e.g., Television Transmission v. Public Util. Com., 47 Cal. 2d 82, 89, 301 P.2d 862
(1956) (Traynor, J.).
6. For example, in the past, many cities decided not to allow cable television. Such a
position obviously could not be adopted in connection with any true utility service.
7. See, e.g., TM Cablevision of San Diego County v. Daon Corp., No. 15067 (San Diego
Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1981).
8. 9 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 26.155, at 389 (3rd ed. 1978).
9. See, e.g., California Public Utilities Comm'n, General Orders, Nos. 95, 128.
10. 7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 24.323, at 189 (3rd ed. 1981).
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or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions on them."n
Any need for rules to deal with safety problems created by cable
television might not be great enough to allow a municipality to
make the activity illegal or to impose harsh regulations.', More-
over, if it is safe for a municipality to operate a cable system, it
would seem that it would be safe for a private cable company to do
the same.
B. Dedication
Once a municipality decides to enter the field of providing cable
television services, cable companies may have the right to use the
municipality's rights-of-way under the principle of dedication.
This principle has been explained as follows:
"Property may be shown to have been devoted to a public use by
implication from the acts of its owners and their dealings and re-
lations to such property, without regard to statutory provisions.
[Citations.] The test to be applied . . . is whether or not those
offering the service have expressly or impliedly held themselves
out as engaging in the business of supplying the [service] to the
public as a class, 'not necessarily to all of the public, but to any
limited portion of it, such portion, for example, as could be served
from his system, as contradistinguished from holding himself out
as serving or ready to serve only particular individuals, either as a
matter of accommodation or for other reasons peculiar and par-
ticular to them . ' ""
The municipality might have impliedly held itself out as engaging
in the business of supplying cable television rights-of-way to all, or
at least to those who are within the class of cable television compa-
nies. Thus, especially as municipalities are prohibited by some
state constitutions and often by their own charters from granting
exclusive rights,14 the rights-of-way may be deemed to have been
devoted to a public use and cable companies may then have the
right to use them.
11. Id.
12. Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd
sub nom., Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970).
13. Yucaipa Water Co. No. 1 v. Public Utilities Com., 54 Cal. 2d 823, 827-28, 9 Cal. Rptr.
239, 357 P.2d 295 (1960).
14. See, e.g., TM Cablevision of San Diego County v. Daon Corp., No. 15067 (San Diego
Sup. Ct., Jan. 22, 1981), interpreting Cal. Const. art. XI, § 9.
No. 4] 669
Comm/ENT LAW JOURNAL
C. -Prior Rights-Of-Way
The provision of support service by existing utilities to cable
systems is now generally accepted to be a public utility service, just
as in the case of the channel offerings of the 1960s." These utilities
usually already possess rights-of-way over public streets to provide
utility services. Thus, no municipal consent whatsoever may be
necessary for private cable companies to have access to existing
public rights-of-way used by the municipality's system.16
II.
Potential Antitrust Violations
It is questionable whether a municipality may operate a cable
television system to the exclusion of other cable operators without
violating the Sherman Act, absent express direction by the state
and the state may not have the right to give that direction.
A. Restraining Trade
Section 1 of the Sherman Act" forbids "every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States . . . ." There are
three essential elements to a Section 1 offense: (1) a contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy (hereafter refered to as "joint action") (2)
which restrains (3) interstate trade or commerce. Read literally,
Section 1 prohibits all conduct containing these elements. Yet the
courts have mitigated the harshness of the statute by applying a
"Rule of Reason" test to most conduct to determine if there is a
violation.' Certain conduct, however, is deemed so patently harm-
ful and lacking in any social benefit as to constitute a violation per
se."
Joint Action: While not immediately apparent, the joint action
element might be established when a municipality permits only it-
self to provide cable television services. A conspiracy might exist
between the municipality and those with whom it must contract,
as, for example, an independent consultant who recommends and
15. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 767.5 (West Supp. 1980); 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1979).
16. See Re the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, Colo. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, No. 70749 (1968).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973).
18. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
19. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 443 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1977).
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advises action which the municipality subsequently takes.
The joint action element might also be met when a municipality
attempts to exclude all other cable operators after it has given the
right to one company, or has made a request for proposals from
several companies to provide services, and then elects to proceed
alone. Under the "unwilling compliance" or "plaintiff/defendant
combination" doctrine, 0 the would-be excluded cable operators
could constitute, as unwilling participants in their own exclusion
from the market, the required additional actors.
In the situation where the municipality has merely requested
proposals for service, the premise that no contract was ever
reached might not prevent application of the unwilling-compliance
doctrine.2 1
It is also likely that the joint action element of Section 1 can be
established whenever a municipality decides to enter the cable
market exclusively, regardless of the existence of other willing or
unwilling participants. The argument could be based on the fact
that the municipality's rights-of-way are an essential facility," ac-
cess to which cannot be denied to a potential competitor under the
terms of Section 1.28
Restraint: A municipality's refusal to allow other cable operators
to use its rights-of-way in order to install cable may constitute an
unreasonable restraint of trade2 4 under the "essential-facility" doc-
trine. This doctrine was set forth in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. as
follows:
"[W]here facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by would-be
competitors, those in.possession of them must allow them to be
shared on fair terms. It is illegal restraint of trade to foreclose the
scarce facility." . . . To be "essential" a facility need not be indis-
20. Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968); City
of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 456 F. Supp. 360, 369 (D. Conn. 1978).
21. See Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co., 402 F.2d 69, 71 (10th Cir. 1968).
22. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
956 (1978).
23. The Hecht case actually involved an essential facility which was leased by one defen-
dant to another. Id. at 985. The purpose of the concept, which is to prevent restraints of
trade resulting from the possession of an essential facility, indicates that the principle may
be applicable when one actor excludes another from the marketplace by using its control of
essential facilities to restrain trade.
24. In order to prove a "rule-of-reason" Section 1 violation, relevant geographic and prod-
uct markets must be defined. Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954, 962 (5th Cir.
1978). In this article this is done in connection with the Sherman Act § 2 discussion, part
IIB, infra.
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pensable; it is sufficient if duplication of the facility would be eco-
nomically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handi-
cap on potential market entrants. Necessarily, this principle must
be carefully delimited: the antitrust laws do not require that an
essential facility be shared if such sharing would be impractical or
would inhibit the defendant's ability to serve its customers
adequately."
The Hecht court concluded that a would-be competing profes-
sional team could not be excluded from a government-owned foot-
ball stadium in favor of an exclusive franchise. In the same man-
ner, a municipality's rights-of-way might be essential facilities for
cable television. Since denial of access to such essential facilities is
tantamount to total exclusion from the marketplace, it may be that
access could not be denied.
A cable company would not even have to satisfy the Rule of Rea-
son test if it could establish a per se violation." Among the types
of conduct that have been held to be per se restraints in violation
of Section 1 are division of markets and price fixing. 7 If a munici-
pality decides to operate a cable television system to the exclusion
of all other cable operators, its conduct might amount to both of
these per se violations. A division of markets might occur by the
municipality's allocating to itself the entire, or a portion of, the
cable television market within its boundaries. Price fixing might
result from the municipality replacing the chance for a competitive
market, where "the choice of price" can be left to the consumer,
with a monopolistic or anticompetitive situation where price com-
petition is non-existent.
Interstate Trade: The Supreme Court has held "that CATV sys-
tems are engaged in interstate communication, even where . . . the
intercepted signals emanate from stations located within the same
State in which the CATV system operates." 9 Thus, the third ele-
ment of a Section 1 violation will always be present when a munici-
pality operates a cable television system.
25. 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978) (footnotes
omitted).
26. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 50-51.
27. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
28. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1040 (D.
Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, - U.S. , 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
29. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1968) (footnote omit-
ted). "CATV" is an acronym for community antenna television; it is now ordinarily replaced
by the phrase "cable television." See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1029 n.2
(8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1978).
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B. Monopolistic Trade
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits actual monopolization of,
attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize trade.30
Conspiracy to Monopolize: The elements of a Section 2 conspir-
acy violation are: "(1) proof of a concerted action deliberately en-
tered into with the specific intent to accomplish the unlawful re-
sult of achieving a monopoly; [and] (2) the commission of at least
one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy."" It should be
noted that the relevant market need not be defined3 2 and that
market power need not be shown 3 to prove this offense.
Whether concerted action could be established when a munici-
pality decides to operate a cable television system to the exclusion
of others has been previously discussed.34 An overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy may occur when a municipality denys a re-
quest by a cable company to use its rights-of-way.
The specific intent required for a Section 2 conspiracy claim is
"a specific intent to destroy competition or achieve monopoly.""
This may be inferred from conduct." If the defendant is powerful
and the conduct tends to erect barriers to entry, the necessary spe-
cific intent can be inferred even from relatively unaggressive con-
duct.3 7 Thus, a municipality's denial of permission to use its rights-
of-way, though apparently innocuous by itself, may be sufficient
proof of an intent to monopolize the cable television market, con-
sidering its strong control over the rights-of-way and the appar-
ently permanent barrier to competition resulting from the denial.
Attempt to Monopolize: The elements of an attempt to monopo-
lize violation are: (1) a specific intent to monopolize, and (2) a dan-
gerous probability of success.3" The "dangerous probability" re-
30. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1973).
31. L. SULLIVAN, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 49 (1977).
32. Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567, 576 (10th Cir. 1975).
33. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corporation, 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2nd Cir.
1961).
34. See text accompanying notes 20-23, supra.
35. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 31, § 51 (citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953)).
36. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 31, § 49.
37. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 31, §§ 49, 51; see also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100,
107 (1948).
38. Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Company, 515 F.2d 835, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976). The specific intent element has been discussed above. See text accom-
panying notes 35-36, supra. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 31, § 49.
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quirement can be met "by showing that the defendant has
sufficient power to create a monopoly and has committed overt
acts in furtherance of that goal . . . .""
In order to ascertain market power, it is helpful to first define
the relevant markets.4 0 There are two types of relevant markets:
the product market and the geographic market. Depending on the
various circumstances involved, the relevant product market could
be defined as, on the one hand, simply providing rights-of-way, or,
on the other hand, providing a wide spectrum of existing and fu-
ture services to cable television. The relevant geographic market
for a municipality operating a cable television system may be sim-
ply the area within the municipality. That is the area in which
competition is being prevented, and cable television subscribers in
that area probably could not look to suppliers from outside the
area.4 1
Assuming that the relevant markets can be defined as proposed
above, it is possible that a municipality would be liable for a Sec-
tion 2 attempt offense if it decides to provide cable television ser-
vices to the exclusion of all cable companies. The mere fact that it
may take a substantial amount of time to build the cable system
and get it operational would be no defense .4 A present ability and
effort to exclude other competitors and control price is enough to
incur liability.4"
Monopolization: The elements of a monopolization violation are:
(1) monopoly power in the relevant markets; and (2) a general in-
tent to monopolize. The relevant markets are discussed above.
General intent is not difficult to prove, and can be inferred from
acts constituting a restraint of trade."
Monopoly power has been defined as the power "to raise prices
or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so."4 Municipal-
ities which prevent entry into the cable television market except
on their terms, or who exclude all cable television competitors in
39. Cullum Elec. & Mechanical v. Mechanical Contractors, 436 F. Supp. 418, 425 (D.S.C.
1976), aff'd, 569 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
40. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 31, § 12.
41. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949).
42. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 31, § 51(b).
43. Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. ANTITRUST ADVISER, §§ 1.54, 1.59, at 57, 64 (2d ed. 1971).
45. See text accompanying notes 40-41, supra.
46. ANTITRUST ADVISER, supra note 44, § 1.59, at 65.
47. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
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favor of a city-owned system, obviously possess monopoly power in
its purest form.
If a municipality attempts to enter -the field of cable television
without permitting other cable companies to operate within its ju-
risdiction, monopoly power may be present. Under such circum-
stances, its power to exclude cable competitors appears to be un-
limited. The municipality would also be able to change its prices
without competition from other cable suppliers, which is an obvi-
ous form of monopoly power.
C. A Natural Monopoly?
Cities are increasingly characterizing cable television as a "natu-
ral monopoly", and there is dictum in an early case to this effect."'
Thus, many have advanced the phrase "natural monopoly" as a
justification for stringent controls over the cable television me-
dium, and as justification for municipal ownership. 9 Some cable-
casters share the view that the natural monopoly concept permits a
municipality to grant the right to provide cable television services
to only one company-at least so long as they are the ones who
have been granted the right to enter the market.5 0 So, it seems
48. Lamb Enterprises v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1972). It should be
noted that Lamb is of little continuing value. Lamb did not involve one permit. Lamb in-
volved multiple permits rather than restraints on trade. The plaintiff competitor lost be-
cause it had not competed and was thus responsible for its own weak market position. More
important, however, is that the reference to "natural monopoly" in this pre-satellite case is
incorrect. The Lamb case dealt with a form of antiquated "lease-back" construction which is
no longer used due to FCC rulings. See Final Report & Order, F.C.C. Docket No. 18509,
aff'd sub nom., General Telephone v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
49. As one judge has observed:
On appeal, the city's sole defense is to pretend, disingeniously and contrary to the
extensive, uncontradicted testimony and the specific findings of the trial judge,
and contrary to its own City Attorney's advice, that cable is a "natural monopoly."
The city's sole argument in this case is that because there can be only one cable
operator in Boulder, the moratorium was necessary to prevent CCC from "wiring
the entire city" before the city could conduct its bid process and select what it
considered the "best" company to enjoy that monopoly. Not to put too fine a
point on it, that argument is today simply fallacious. As the trial judge found, and
as the record makes clear, modern technology makes free and open competition
both practically and economically available to the city by at least four competing
cable communicators.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 712 (10th Cir. 1980)
(Markey, C. J., dissenting), rev'd, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). The Tenth Circuit's
majority disagreed with Judge Markey on a question of law, but did not dispute this factual
issue.
50. The phrase "overbuild" is thus sometimes used by cablecasters in a negative way to
describe competition. A more appropriate phrase might be "competitively built."
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likely that some municipalities will look to the use of the concept
of "natural monopoly" as a shield from legal liability. However,
several factors indicate that this concept may not provide the ha-
ven being promised.
1. Cable Operators Possess No Monopoly Over
Cable Television Services
The question of the technological ability of cable operators to
compete against each other was raised in Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder." Judge Matsch stated: "Under the
present technology, more than one cable company can be on the
same poles without adversely affecting the public [rights-of-way].
While there certainly are finite limits to overbuilding, those limits
are something beyond two companies."5
As a practical matter, economic considerations used to, and still
may in some cases, preclude competition among cable operators in
certain markets. This may establish some markets as "thin mar-
kets."" However, "thin market" status does not create a right for a
municipality to decide by fiat that only one company can operate.
In addition, the cable television medium has undergone tremen-
dous changes over the last few years which have made competition
economically viable. Foremost among these changes is the advent
of satellite technology, which makes possible nationwide program-
ming such as movies, sports,.or news channels." These services can
be included in the basic service or sold as a supplemental service.
Another important change has been the relaxation of Federal Com-
munications Commission rules which limited the cable operator's
choice of signals." As a result of these changes, cablecasters are
now providing more diversified and entertaining programming.
With the more popular programming has come much greater mar-
ket penetration and higher revenues per subscriber. Thus, there
would appear to be many more dollars being spent on cable televi-
sion for which cable operators can compete.
51. 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo. 1980), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, - U.S.
, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
52. 485 F. Supp. at 1038. This finding was not disturbed by the Tenth Circuit's reversal.
The lack of physical scarcity is especially apparent with underground construction.
53. See note 57, infra.
54. See note 1 and accompanying text, supra.
55. 57 F.C.C.2d 625 (1976). See FCC Now All But Out of Cable Business, BROADCASTING,
July 28, 1980, at 25.
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Competition between cable companies has become a reality in
several markets. For example, in the City of Albuquerque, New
Mexico, which has a population of only 330,000, WGN Electronic
Systems has a franchise which is facing competition from a locally
owned franchise, Valley Cablevision.5" Phoenix, Arizona has issued
several citywide cable television permits, with no apparent adverse
consequences."
2. The Marketplace Must Determine if "Natural
Monopoly" Exists
Assuming that a particular area were unable to support more
than one cable television system, it might be improper to exclude a
second cable operator on that basis. It has been held that one can
determine whether a market is a thin market (i.e., a "natural mo-
nopoly")58 only by allowing free market forces to compete.59 If the
market supports only one supplier, it is a thin market, and the sur-
viving competitor cannot be condemned for benefitting from the
"very forces which it is [the Sherman Act's] prime object to foster
. . . ."60 Thus, a municipality may not be able to prevent cable
operators from providing services because it believes that only one
system could survive, and that the municipality's system should be
the one system.
D. State Action Immunity for Exclusive Municipal
Systems?
The antitrust laws represent a national pro-competition policy of
paramount importance." This congressionally mandated free-mar-
ket policy even prevails over other social goals to the extent that
such goals are anticompetitive.62 Thus, there is a "heavy presump-
56. The Albuquerque Overbuild-Small Competitor, Big Reaction, TVC MAGAZINE,
March 15, 1981, at 88.
57. See License No. 17633 between the City of Phoenix and American Cable Television,
Inc., November 24, 1976 (citywide); License No. 25332 between the City of Phoenix and
Camelback Cablevision, Inc., September 2, 1980 (citywide); License No. 25333 between the
City of Phoenix and Cross County Cable, September 2, 1980 (citywide); License No. 25334
between the City of Phoenix and Western Cablevision Services, Inc., September 2, 1980
(requested district).
58. "Thin market" is a preferable phrase. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 31, § 45.
59. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 n.4 (1st
Cir. 1960).
60. United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2nd Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
61. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
62. Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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tion against implicit exemptions" from the antitrust law."
The doctrine that state action" is immune from antitrust liabil-
ity was first recognized in Parker v. Brown. 5 The immunity was
based on a federalism rationale that the states are entitled to some
federal deference in the area of economic policy because they are
sovereign in their own right."' The Supreme Court has concluded
that the proper balance between national antitrust policy and state
sovereignty is to enforce the antitrust laws unless the state, acting
governmentally as a sovereign, clearly expresses an anticompetitive
policy. 7 And, even assuming a clearly adopted policy to displace
competition, if the state attempts to act as a sovereign to displace
competition in a way which involves a violation of the U.S. Consti-
tution, the action-being invalid-may not be sufficient to create
immunity.68
The issue of whether cities are immune from antitrust liability
was raised in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 9
While there was no majority opinion in that case, it was clear that
a majority of the Court believed that Congress did not intend to
automatically exempt local governments from antitrust laws."
Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court appear to follow the
plurality opinion requirement in City of Lafayette" that a munici-
pality must follow a "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed" state policy in order to be exempt.72
63. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
64. "State action" in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), is much narrower than state
action in other contexts. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 590-91 (1976);
Susman & Wawro, Antitrust Issues in Cable Television Franchising, 3 CoMM/ENr L.J. 645
(1982).
65. 317 U.S. at 341.
66. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1977).
67. Id.
68. It is self-evident that the prerequisite state policy must be valid state policy. There-
fore, if a state's anticompetitive policy violated the First Amendment, for example, it would
not in fact constitute a valid state policy and could not survive. Accordingly, such a policy
would not be available to exempt a city from antitrust liability.
69. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
70. Speaking for a plurality of the court, Justice Brennan stated that "the Parker doc-
trine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the State
as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition with
regulation or monopoly public service." 435 U.S. at 413. In a concurring opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Burger declared, "[tihe threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity
is [immune] is whether the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign." 435 U.S. at
425 (emphasis in original).
71. See note 70, supra.
72. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
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In Community Communications Co. v. Boulder," the Supreme
Court was presented with the issue of municipal antitrust liability
in the context of cable television. Petitioner, Community Commu-
nications Co. (C.C.C.), had a revocable, non-exclusive permit to
conduct a cable television business within the city limits of the
City of Boulder. Respondent, the City of Boulder, is a "home rule"
municipality under the Colorado Constitution. Until 1979, C.C.C.
was limited by economic realities to operating only in the sections
of the City of Boulder that did not receive off-air television well.
With the advent of new technologies," C.C.C. began in 1979 to ex-
pand its service to other areas of the city. The City of Boulder
imposed a moratorium on that expansion, and announced that it
planned to invite other cable television to apply for a permit.75
C.C.C. filed suit alleging, inter alia, that while the city could allow
other cable television companies to provide services in the city, the
moratorium on C.C.C.'s expansion constituted a restraint of trade
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.7  The city argued
that it was immune from antitrust liability, especially since it is a
"home rule" city. The Supreme Court. disagreed. It held that the
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy re-
quirement for municipality antitrust immunity was the settled law
of the Court." Even "home rule" cities have to meet this burden.78
The Court found that the state of Colorado had no such policy.79
Thus, C.C.C. could state a claim for relief for federal antitrust
(1980); see also New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96,
109 (1978).
73. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
74. See note 1 and accompanying text, supra.
75. Chief Judge Markey, in his dissenting opinion in Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), majority rev'd, - U.S. -, 70 L.Ed.2d 810
(1982), stated that the goal of the city by this conduct was "competition for the market, not
competition in the market." 630 F.2d at 719 (emphasis in original). As he explained:
The city's brief repeats, in reference to the First Amendment, that its morato-
rium was to prevent CCC's monopolization and "to foster competition in" the
marketplace. But the city could have done all that with ease by merely granting
additional non-exclusive licenses. As established in the record, found by the trial
judge, and not denied by the majority, the moratorium, and its continuation, is
critical to the city's effort to prevent competition and to insure monopolization,
albeit by the monopolist it considers "best."
Id. at 714 n.11.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973).
77. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 835, 842
(1982).
78. Id. at 10.
79. Id. at 14.
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violations."
III.
Potential Constitutional Violations
If a municipality precludes cable companies from disseminating
news, information and entertainment while operating its own cable
television system, it may violate the First Amendment, as applied
to cities through the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Freedom of Expression
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in part, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press . . . ."81 This mandate is fully appli-
cable to the states and cities by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment.8 2
The freedoms of expression protected by this amendment oc-
cupy a preferred position among the fundamental rights of Ameri-
can citizens," and may not be infringed unless absolutely neces-
sary to safeguard other compelling governmental interests.8" The
difficult standard which governments must satisfy when they seek
to control expression has been delineated as follows: "[L]aws re-
stricting the exercise of First Amendment activities are inherently
suspect and bear a heavy presumption against their constitutional
validity.""
It is a basic tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that, except
to avoid certain narrow categories of speech, a government may
not absolutely prohibit a speaker from communicating with its au-
dience. As explained in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC:
Regulation intended to curtail expression-either directly by ban-
80. Perhaps of great significance is the fact that the Supreme Court did not condition the
right of a cable television company to sue for federal antitrust violations on a municipality's
position regarding the status of a license agreement, or some other form of "franchise" from
the municipality to use its rights-of-way. This is so despite the City's purported termination
(not mentioned by the Supreme Court, yet discussed by both parties in their briefs to the
Court) of C.C.C.'s right to provide any cable television services to Boulder districts encom-
passing two-thirds of the City. Brief for the Respondent at 7; Brief for Petitioner at 15.
81. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
82. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1937).
83. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
84. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
85. Swearson v. Myers, 455 F. Supp. 88, 91 (D. Kan. 1978) (citing Shuttlesworth v. Bir-
mingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)).
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ning speech because of a harm thought to stem from its commu-
nicative or persuasive effect on its intended audience, [citations
omitted] or indirectly by favoring certain speakers over others,
[citations omitted]-can be justified (if at all) only under catego-
rization doctrines such as obscenity, "fighting words," or "clear
and present danger.""
Except for the justification that communication falls within the
narrow categories of unprotected speech, a complete ban on a
speaker's means of distributing its message is unconstitutional.
Regulations must "leave open ample alternative channels for com-
munications . ."87 Merely assuming that the message will some-
how be communicated to the audience, either by another speaker
or by this speaker in another area, does not permit a governmental
body to prohibit a speaker from communicating in his chosen
area.8 8
The same considerations always govern, whether a municipality
attempts to control a leaflet, a newspaper, or a cable television sys-
tem. It would appear that modern cable television is entitled to
First Amendment rights comparable to those of the printed
press.89 Accordingly, courts are likely to examine with rigorous
scrutiny a municipality's control of cable television dissemination
via exclusive operation. Dissemination of news, information, and
entertainment by a competitive cable company is thus protected
86. 567 F.2d 9, 47-48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
87. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
88. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
89. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1053 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 44-46; Greater
Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd sub norn,
Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970); Weaver v.
Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 242, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 411 P.2d 289 (1966); Television Transmission,
Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 47 Cal. 2d 82, 89, 301 P.2d 862 (1956). Apparently, a contrary
conclusion was recently reached by the Tenth Circuit on the on-going Boulder litigation.
Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981),
rev'd, 496 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1980). The Tenth Circuit admitted that "[clable operators,
like publishers and wireless broadcasters, are entitled to First Amendment protection." Id.
at 1376. However, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for findings of fact as to whether
cable television dissemination was subject to "scarcity" problems which would warrant con-
trols like the FCC applies to broadcasters. Id. at 1379-80. However, the trial court had al-
ready expressly found as a matter of fact that there is no scarcity problem. 496 F. Supp. at
827-30; 485 F. Supp. at 1038-40. Other courts of appeals agree. "The First Amendment the-
ory espoused in National Broadcasting Co. and reaffirmed in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
cannot be directly applied to cable television since an essential precondition of that the-
ory-physical interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government-is ab-
sent." Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 44-45.
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speech, unless it constitutes "a clear and present danger," "fighting
words," or obscenity.90
B. Equal Protection
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."91 This prohibition also applies to cities." The Supreme
Court in Avery v. Midland Co. stated: "The Equal Protection
Clause does not, of course, require that the state never distinguish
between citizens, but only that the distinctions that are made not
be arbitrary or invidious.""
To determine if the distinctions are invidious, a court must first
ascertain what distinctions or "classifications" have been made. In
terms of media classifications, a municipality's refusal to allow a
cable company to disseminate, assuming it has allowed a newspa-
per, theater, television station, or radio station to disseminate,
might create an improper classification of cable television opera-
tors different from all other First Amendment disseminators.
The next step in determining whether there is an invidious dis-
crimination is to find the appropriate level of review. Any classifi-
cation created by a governmental entity which infringes upon the
fundamental constitutional rights of others is suspect unless
demonstrated to be necessary to a compelling governmental inter-
est." The "necessary" part of this strict scrutiny test requires that
there be no less intrusive means for achieving the compelling gov-
ernment interest." First Amendment rights are among the funda-
mental constitutional rights that are within the protection of the
Equal Protection Clause." Thus, the strict scrutiny test would be
applied to a municipality's classification of cable television.
Exclusive municipal operation of cable television might have se-
rious difficulty in surviving such strict scrutiny. What compelling
interest would it narrowly serve? It could not be seriously sug-
gested that the desire to provide high quality theaters, newspapers,
90. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-21 (1971).
91. U.S. CONST., amend XIV.
92. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968).
93. Id. at 484.
94. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
95. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
96. NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
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or other First Amendment disseminators would permit municipal
ownership of those enterprises. Obviously, the consumer should
have the right to make such a decision. The same reasoning applies
to cable television.97 Furthermore, operating a cable television
franchise to the exclusion of all cable companies probably is not
the least restrictive means of achieving any compelling interest.
IV.
Conclusion
These few observations merely hint at the numerous legal
problems which may confront a city interested in municipal cable
television ownership. Beyond the issues of fundamental govern-
mental authority, antitrust, and constitutional law presented by
such ownership, there are many other practical and business diffi-
culties which are not discussed here. Even these practical difficul-
ties would vary with the specifics of any given case. This-is not to
say that municipal cable television systems cannot be lawfully and
profitably operated, but it is suggested that any such venture be
analyzed carefully before a decision to devote public funds is
finalized.
97. Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 662-63 (N.D. Ohio 1968),
aff'd sub nom, Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970).
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